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Our visual system achieves remarkable
feats: we can easily recognize an
elephant, even when its image in our
eye actually appears as a set of stripes
when it is located behind a fence. This
mechanism also works for objects
less familiar to us, and also when we
remove surface-identifying cues such
as color: our visual system interpolates
missing elements, infers what is
in the foreground and what in the
background, disentangles occluded
parts from occluder, and allows us to
perceive surfaces and objects rather
than the clutter of unconnected lines
and patches that fall onto the retina.
In technical terms, our visual system
tidies up the incoming information by
grouping, scene segmentation, and
selection. Psychologists have come up
with ways to expose this mechanism in
extreme forms, a classic example being
the Kanizsa triangle: the only physical
cues in this stimulus are pacmen, which
form the corners and give rise to the
perception of illusory contours forming
a triangle (Figure 1).
A number of past human functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies used such illusory contour-
inducing stimuli and compared the
evoked activity to that of control
stimuli, such as rotated pacmen
that did not give rise to the illusion.
Several researchers have reported an
enhancement of activity in early visual
cortex associated with perception of
the illusion [1], whereas others reported
an overall reduction of activity [2,3].
In a human fMRI study reported in
this issue of Current Biology, Kok and
de Lange [4] have now mapped with
unprecedented spatial resolution
and clarity the activity in the early
visual cortex (areas V1 and V2) when
participants viewed Kanizsa displays.
The results are remarkable: compared
to viewing a display with rotated
inducers that does not give rise to
the illusion, when the illusion wasperceived, activity in cortical sites
representing regions inside the
illusory triangle was enhanced, and
activity of sites representing the
inducers suppressed. In addition,
activity increased in the cortical site
representing a pacman that was not
part of the illusion.
It appears that, depending on the
precise cortical representation of the
Kanizsa triangle, opposite neural
effects occur that were overseen in
prior studies as a result of averaging
across neural regions containing both
effects. Attention (illusory contours
may drawmore attention) cannot easily
account for the present results or for
their divergence with earlier results:
distractor tasks had been used in
either set of prior studies, and the
present study [4] shows that the results
remain qualitatively the same when
participants either actively attend the
illusory shape or perform a highly
demanding central distractor task.
The real news, however, is not the
resolution of a prior conundrum, but
rather that some of the results have not
been shown with such clarity in fMRI or
in invasive electrophysiology before.
So far, the much more detailed
research using electrophysiology on
scene segmentation distinguished
four distinct processes, signaling of:
real or illusory contours; border
ownership; figure–ground surface; and
attentional selection. Most neurons in
visual cortex respond more to edges
within their receptive field than to a
uniform surface. The processing of
contours therefore accounts for most
of the neural activity in early visual
cortex. In addition to coding for real
contours, about a third of orientation-
selective V2 neurons also respond to
illusory contours that span across
uniform space, as seen in Kanizsa-type
stimuli. Many fewer V1 neurons also
signal illusory borders, and they do so
only when these are formed by closely
spaced patterns on either side of the
contour [5,6]. Contour signaling iscomparably unsophisticated, as it does
not distinguish what a given contour
belongs to: every contour has only one
‘owner’, and this ownership determines
which side of the contour contains fore-
and background.
In the example of the elephant
behind the fence, all vertical contours
‘belong’ exclusively to the fence, even
though each contour has one side
facing the elephant. If there were
neurons in the brain that signal for
each contour which side of it contains
the foreground, a major problem
of scene-segmentation would be
resolved. It turns out that more than
50% of edge-responsive neurons in
V2, and about 20% of those in V1,
show this so-called border-ownership
selectivity [7].
Computational modeling has shown
that long-range connections between
neurons within a single area (V1 or
V2) can in principle account for
illusory contour responses and for
border-ownership selectivity, but, as
so often, experimental evidence has
shown that the brain goes beyond
model predictions: feedback from
higher-level areas plays a decisive
role in scene segmentation. Research
has shown that the time delays
of border-ownership-selectivity
responses are so short that they must
reflect feedback from higher-level
areas, and thus cannot be due to the
much slower intra-areal spread [8].
Also, the removal of extrastriate
regions reduces perception of
foreground figures and of illusory
contours, suggesting that higher-level
regions play an important role in scene
segmentation (see, for example,
discussion in [9]). Finally, a human
study suggests that the perception
of illusory figures is influenced by
activity in parietal cortex [10]. Scene
segmentation signals in V1 and V2 are
therefore at least partially relayed to
them via higher-level regions.
In visual perception, foreground
surfaces stand out relative to the
background (see illusory triangle in
Figure 1). In theory, the brain could
save energy by merely encoding
edge-related information, which is
interpreted perceptually as filled
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Figure 1. fMRI modulation and theoretical predictions related to scene segmentation.
(A) Kanisza triangle and outlier pacman (left) and control stimulus (middle). On the right is
illustrated the activity difference (Kanisza minus control) in early visual cortex as observed
in the current study [4] and projected into the stimulus display. (B) Predicted activity based
on electrophysiology related to scene segmentation. Reduction of background has only rarely
been observed. (C) Predicted modulation based on ‘biased competition’ theory: distributing
limited resources over two versus over four objects can account for the results in (A).
(D) Predicted modulation based on ‘predictive coding’ theory: illusory contours should receive
massive up-regulation, fate of triangle-foreground is uncertain.
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the case: neurons in V1 and V2 with
receptive fields inside the foreground
tend to fire with higher rates than
those in the background, thus negating
the above edge-only coding scheme
[11,12]. The filling-in response could be
mediated by lateral inhibition between
neurons of similar feature-selectivity.
For example, imagine a small
foreground object with a unique feature
(for example, a red surface on green
background). Lateral inhibition within
V1 or V2 will spread and eventually
lead to a divergence of firing between
foreground-encoding neurons (the
minority, with less inhibition) and
background (the majority, with more
inhibition). This could cause rapid
filling-in responses (within 10 ms) also
in the absence of attention in V1 and
V2 [11]. Alternatively, there is good
evidence suggesting that feedback
from figure-encoding neurons, for
example in area V4, could also enhance
responses [9,12].
A central question is howmuch of the
above occurs automatically, and how
much only when we pay attention to a
particular figure. Patients with parietal
lesions provided evidence for ‘pre-
attentive’ scene segmentation early
on: they were blind to rotated pacmen
in their left, deficient, visual hemifield,
but could perceive them when
illusory Kanizsa-edges connected
them to pacmen in their right, intact,
hemifield [13]. In accord with this,
border-ownership selectivity
responses and surface-filling occur
in parallel across a scene, and
independent of attention [11,12,14].
Interestingly, the subpopulation of
neurons showing border-ownership
selectivity largely overlaps with that
receiving attentional modulation.
Also, attentional modulation is largely
asymmetric, in that it primarily
enhances border-ownership selectivity
and surface responses of the attended
foreground rather than suppressing
unattended background [12,14]. The
visual unit of attentional selection
therefore occurs at the object-level in
early cortex, leading to a competition
between objects and surfaces for
attentional resources.
With this in mind, the enhancement
of the Kanizsa-surface in the new study
[4] makes sense— it reflects automatic
enhancement of a foreground figure.
What is puzzling, new, and likely to
inspire more research is the selective
reduction of the activity relating to theinducers, along with enhancement of
the outlier pacman. Two potential
mechanisms related to currently
popular theories come to mind. In the
first of these, ‘biased competition’,
visual objects compete for a limited set
of neural resources. Processes such
as attention can bias the competition[15]. In the control-condition, four
pacmen compete for resources. In the
Kanizsa-condition, it is down to two:
Kanizsa-triangle and outlier-pacman;
compared to the control, both enjoy
enhanced top-down resources, while
the Kanizsa-inducers receive less, as
they are no longer competing objects.
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invokes ‘predictive coding’: early
cortex receives predictive feedback
from higher-level regions, and signal
mismatches with respect to the
sensory input [16]. There is a mismatch
between prediction and input with
regards to the (top-down predicted)
illusory Kanizsa-contours, and
arguably also with the surface: they
have no sensory correlate, leading to
enhanced activity. The sensory input
of the three inducing pacmen matches
the prediction: they form the corners of
the predicted triangle, thus generating
less error-signal, accounting for their
reduced activity. This account does
not easily explain why the outlier
pacman’s activity is enhanced, as it
was equally un-predictable in the
control condition that served as
baseline for the comparison. The
strength and weakness of predictive
coding is its simplicity — it tempts us
to snub detailed mechanistic accounts.
For example, it is unclear whether
or how predictive coding combines
with the concrete mechanisms of
scene segmentation and competition
described above that provide an
equally good account for the results
(Figure 1).
A number of questions arise from
the results [4] that have implications
for past and future studies. First, the
elephant in the room, the target of this
and of prior studies, that still remains
hidden behind the fence — what is
the signal of illusory Gestalt contours?
Can it eventually be unmasked fromfore- and background modulation?
Also, why was there no interaction
of scene segmentation with attention,
whereas physiology suggests
otherwise? Why did Gestalt-encoding
in so many prior fMRI studies lead
to negative net-signal [2,3,10], while
physiology almost invariably reported
positive modulations? What is the
functional difference between V1
and V2? What are the origins of the
observed modulations — intra-areal,
V4, object-coding regions, parietal
cortex?And, perhapsmost importantly:
do the answers to some of the above
questions lie in fMRI, once again,
picking up signals that physiology
missed out on, and vice versa [17,18]?
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Hibernator Know When to Stop
Hibernating?Deep hibernators that spend winter in a hypothermic coma below ground can
still emerge and reproduce in spring at the right moment. A recent study shows
that specific cells of the pituitary may harbor the internal calendar responsible
for this.Roelof A. Hut1,*, Hugues Dardente2,
and Sjaak J. Riede1
Many species in seasonal
environments enter a state of
dormancy in winter to avoid
unfavorable conditions, such as lowtemperatures and reduced energy
resources. This behaviour can be
found in micro-organisms, plants,
invertebrates and vertebrates. An
example of a unicellular organism
that enters winter dormancy is
the dinoflagellate Alexandrium(Gonyaulaceae). It drops to the
sea floor to enter a state of winter
quiescence when days get short and
light availability is low. A similar
behaviour occurs in deep hibernators
like ground squirrels and several
hamster species: they retreat in their
burrows, seal the entrance and stay
below ground for 6–8 months in a
state of deep hibernation with body
temperatures slightly above ambient
temperature (w5–10C) [1]. Although
winter dormancy may increase
survival, it also introduces a problem:
both the algae in the mud of the sea
floor and the hibernators in their
burrows are overwintering under
stable conditions in the absence
of light. Since perception of day
